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Abstract
Strategies in a stochastic game are δ-perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ-equilibrium
properties. In special cases the existence of δ-perfect strategies for all positive δ implies the existence
of -equilibria for every positive . Using this approach we prove the existence of -equilibria for every
positive  for a special class of quitting games. The proof reveals that more general proofs for the existence
of -equilibria in stochastic games must involve the topological structure of how the equilibria of one-stage
games are related to changes in the payoffs.
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1. Introduction
A stochastic game is played on a state space. The present state and the present behavior
of all players determine stochastically the transition to a new state. All players have complete
knowledge of the past history of play and the present state. There may be no bound on the
number of stages of play.
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2 R.S. Simon / Advances in Applied Mathematics 38 (2007) 1–26For any non-negative , an -equilibrium in a game is a profile of strategies, one for each
player, such that no player can gain in expected payoff by more than  by choosing a differ-
ent strategy, given that all the other players do not change their strategies. An equilibrium is
a 0-equilibrium. We say that approximate equilibria exist if for every positive  there exists an
-equilibrium. A two-person game is zero-sum when the payoff to one player is always the neg-
ative of the payoff to the other player; if there is an equilibrium for a zero-sum game then there
is a unique equilibrium payoff (to player one) and it is called the value of the game.
Shapley [15] introduced the concept of a stochastic game in the context of discounted zero-
sum games with finitely many states where for every pair of actions (one for each player) at any
state there is an associated payoff that is independent of the past history of play. The payoffs are
discounted, meaning that there is a positive quantity ρ strictly less than one such that for every
i  0 the (i +1)st stage of play is worth ρ times that of the ith stage of play. Shapley showed that
such zero-sum stochastic game have equilibria and values obtainable from stationary strategies,
meaning that the strategies are independent of the history of play (and are dependent only on the
state). This original context is very restricted compared to the present study of stochastic games.
For this reason there is some disagreement concerning exactly what is a stochastic game. We
give the following definition of a normal stochastic game, introduced in [16].
A stochastic game is normal if:
(1) There are finitely or countably many states;
(2) There are finitely many players and at any state the action sets for all players are finite;
(3) The payoffs defined in the game are uniformly bounded;
(4) The payoffs are functions on the histories of play that are measurable with respect to the
Borel σ -algebra defined by the finite stages of the game.
This fourth property will be made more precise later. If all the properties of normality are met
but (4) (and the Axiom of Choice is assumed) then there are examples of zero-sum games without
values [3]. All stochastic games in this paper are normal.
It is not known whether all normal stochastic games have approximate equilibria. This ques-
tion is arguably the most important open question of game theory today. Advantageous for
approximate equilibria in stochastic games is the common knowledge by the players of the past
history of play and of the present options and their consequences. The only uncertainty concerns
what the other players will do in the present and in the future. If a normal stochastic game has
finitely many stages then equilibria exist, a consequence of the Nash proof [12]. Disadvantageous
for approximate equilibria are the infinite number of stages of play.
A normal stochastic game is a limit average game when for every player n the payoff is
between limi→∞ inf and limi→∞ sup of the average 1i
∑i−1
k=0 wnsk (a
1
k , . . . , a
m
k ) where m is the
number of players and for every state s ∈ S wns is a real function defined on the collections
(a1, a2, . . . , am) of actions, one for each player, at the state s.
So far, the most important positive results have concerned two-player limit average stochastic
games. Mertens and Neyman [10] proved that every zero-sum limit average stochastic game with
finitely many states has approximate equilibria and a value. Maitra and Sudderth [7] extended
this result to limit average zero-sum stochastic games with countably many states and Martin [9]
extended this result further to all zero-sum normal stochastic games. Maitra and Sudderth [8]
generalized Martin’s result further to games with a finitely additive law of motion.
Concerning two-player non-zero-sum limit average stochastic games the central result was ac-
complished by Vieille [24–26]; he proved that all such stochastic game with finitely many states
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ably many states the question is still open. There is a positive result by Solan and Shmaya [21]
for stopping games using infinite Ramsey Theory. The principle defining character of a stopping
game is that the players have control over the game only at a single state, however the transitions
may depend on the stage of play.
Related indirectly to approximate equilibria are correlated equilibria. A correlated equilibrium
of a game is an equilibrium of an extended game where the players give signals to and receive
signals from an additional and impartial player and the players may use these signals to deter-
mine their actions. E. Solan characterized the set of correlated equilibria in normal stochastic
games [19] and Solan and Vieille [23] proved that all limit average stochastic games with finitely
many states have correlated equilibria.
One approach to normal stochastic games is to break up the game into infinitely many one-
stage games, an approach used by many authors. With strategies fixed for all players, one assumes
that the players will act according to the given strategies on all the future stages but on the present
stage they are free to choose and the payoff consequences for their actions at the present stage
are determined accordingly. As was shown in [16], the existence of approximate equilibrium
implies a property known as perfection, which concerns -equilibrium conditions for the one
stage games.
This break up of a stochastic game to its one-stage games also breaks up the problem of
the existence of approximate equilibria into two separate questions: (a) does some perfection
property hold, and (b) can this perfection property imply the existence of approximate equilibria?
In many situations (b) can be solved through statistical testing and punishment in response to
statistical deviation, but our work suggests that the success of (b) depends on some kind of finite
partition structure to the strategies (Propositions 1 and 2).
The general model for normal non-zero-sum stochastic games is given in Section 2. Basic
results (Theorems 1 and 2) showing that some forms of perfection will imply the existence of
approximate equilibria is the subject of Section 3. This approach was inspired by the Vieille
proof [24–26], which uses a special case of Theorem 2.
In Section 4 we investigate a special class of stochastic games called quitting games. Examples
of quitting games were studied first by Flesch et al. [2] but defined in generality by Solan and
Vieille [22]. For quitting games a kind of perfection is equivalent to the existence of approximate
equilibria (Theorem 3).
In Section 5 we define a class of quitting games called escape games. Using algebraic topology
we prove that all escape games have the perfection property, hence have approximate equilibria
(Theorem 4).
In the conclusion, we return to the broader question of whether all normal stochastic games
have approximate equilibria.
2. The model
2.1. Normal stochastic games
For every finite or countable set A let Δ(A) stand for the set of all countably-additive prob-
ability distributions on A. If A is finite then Δ(A) is a finite-dimensional simplex. If x ∈ Δ(A)
and a ∈ A then the a coordinate of x will be represented as x(a) (the probability given to a by x).
Given a topological space Ω the Borel subsets are defined to be the smallest σ -algebra of
sets containing all the open sets. A probability measure on Ω is Borel if it is defined on the
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 > 0 there is a closed subset C contained in A and an open subset O containing A such that the
measure of the open set O\C is no more than . If the topology is defined by a metric then all
Borel probability measures are regular [13, Theorem 1.2 of Chapter 2].
Now we make explicit the four properties of normal stochastic games, as stated in the intro-
duction.
There is a countable or finite state space S and a finite set N of players. For every player n ∈ N
and every s ∈ S there is a finite set Ans of actions. For every s ∈ S and every a ∈ As :=
∏
n∈N Ans
(a choice of action for each player) there will be a transition law psa ∈ Δ(S) governing the motion
to states at the next stage of play after a visit to s.
We assume that the game starts at an initial state sˆ ∈ S. (If one prefers to start with a dis-
tribution on all the states in S one can add an initial state sˆ that occurs only at the start of
the game and such that every player has only one action at this state.) Define H∞ := {(sˆ =
s0, a0, s1, a1, . . .) | ∀i  0 ai ∈ Asi , psiai (si+1) > 0}, the set of possible infinite histories of play.
Define Hsˆ0 := {(sˆ)}, and for every i  1 let Hsi be the set of truncations of H∞ of the form
(sˆ = s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , si−1, ai−1, si = s) (leaving out the actions at stage i). LetHi be the union⋃
s∈SHsi and let Hs be the union
⋃∞
i=0Hsi . Let Hω be the union
⋃∞
i=0Hi =
⋃
s∈SHs . If h is in
Hs then we say that h terminates at s. The i stage truncation of either an infinite history in H∞
or of a finite history in Hj for some j  i is the canonical projection to Hi .
We could extend the state space so that distinct past histories of play leads to distinct states.
But then we could lose track of the original structure of the game, especially if it is defined by
a finite state space.
It is easy to define a topology onH∞, the infinite histories of the game. For each finite stage i
there will be only finitely or countably many histories in Hi . An open set of H∞ is the union of
sets of the form Ohi := {h ∈H∞ | the ith stage truncation of h is hi} for a finite history hi ∈Hi .
This topology is also defined by a metric, with the distance between two infinite histories defined
to be 2−i where i is the first stage for which the i stage truncations of the two histories differ.
The payoff for a player n ∈ N is a function Vn onH∞ that is uniformly bounded and measur-
able with respect to the Borel σ -algebra generated by the topology as defined above. Let M  1
be a positive real number larger than the maximal difference between all payoffs in the game.
A two-player game is zero-sum if V1(h) + V2(h) = 0 for all h ∈ H∞ (where without loss of
generality we assume that N = {1,2}).
2.2. Strategies and equilibria
A strategy σn of player n ∈ N is a collection of functions (σ ns | s ∈ S) such that for every
s ∈ S σns is a function from Hs to Δ(Ans ). For every profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N) of strategies, one
strategy for each player, probability distributions μσ,i are induced on the Hi in the natural way.
We start at the initial history (sˆ) ∈Hsˆ0 with μσ,0({(sˆ)}) = 1. Given that μσ,i(hi) is positive for
some hi ∈Hsii and hi+1 ∈Hi+1 is a history such that the i stage truncation of hi+1 is equal to
hi ∈Hsii with hi+1 = (hi, ai, si+1) and ai = (ani | n ∈ N) we define inductively μσ,i+1(hi+1) :=
μσ,i(hi)p
si
ai (si+1)
∏
n∈N σnsi (hi)(a
n
i ). A unique σ -additive Borel probability distribution μσ is
induced on H∞ in the natural way, by the μσ,i and Kolmogorov’s extension theorem [5,13].
Because H∞ is a metric space, the measure μσ is regular. For every player n ∈ N and every
strategy profile σ the distribution μσ generates a payoff Vn(σ ) for player n as the expected value
of the function Vn on H∞, determined by the probability distribution μσ .
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a player k ∈ N define σ | σ˜ k to be the strategy profile such that σ˜ k is the strategy for player k but if
n = k then σn is the strategy for player n. An -equilibrium is a strategy profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N)
such that for any alternative strategy profile (σ˜ n | n ∈ N) and every player n ∈ N it holds that
Vn(σ | σ˜ n)  + Vn(σ ). A zero-sum game has the value r ∈ R for the designated first player if
for every positive  there is an -equilibrium whose expected payoff for the first player is within 
of r .
2.3. Perfection
For any profile σ of strategies, a player n ∈ N , and a stage i of play define vnσ :Hi → R
by vnσ (hi) equaling the expected value of Vn(σ ) conditioned on reaching hi on the ith stage.
Although it is not necessary for this paper, if h is reached with zero probability then vnσ (h) is still
well defined, as the expected payoff for n according to σ from a start at h. Extend to a definition
of vnσ :Hω → R in the natural way.
DefineOi = {Ohi | hi ∈Hi} where Ohi is defined above. A filtration is a sequenceA0,A1, . . .
of σ -algebras (collections of subsets of the same space) such that for every i = 0,1, . . . every
member of Ai is also a member of Ai+1. The Oi define a filtration of H∞. With any player
n ∈ N , finite history hi and strategy profile σ fixed, because vnσ (hi) is equal to the expectation of
vnσ (hi+1) on the next stage, the function vnσ is a martingale with respect to μσ and the filtrations
O0,O1, . . . .
For every player n define χn :S → R so that χn(s) is the min-max value for player n at
the state s, the lowest upper bound for what player n can obtain from a start at s in response
to all strategy choices of the other players. Formally χn(s) equals infσ supσ˜ n Vns (σ | σ˜ n) where
the payoff function Vns is defined by the game for which s is the initial state. The function χn
represents the ability of the players to punish player n with predetermined strategies (for example
as part of an approximate equilibrium).
For every an ∈ Ans and aˆ ∈
∏
k =n Aks let (aˆ, an) be the corresponding member of As =∏
j∈N A
j
s , with aˆk the corresponding action of player k for all k = n.
For any function f :Hω → R, state s ∈ S, finite history h ∈Hs , action an ∈ Ans and strategy
profile σ define wfσ (h)(an) to be the expected value of f on the next stage after h, conditioned
on the use of an by player n and the use of σks (h) by all the other players k = n. This means that
wfσ (h)
(
an
)=∑
t∈S
∑
aˆ∈∏k =n Aks
f
(
h,
(
aˆ, an
)
, t
)
ps
(aˆ,an)
(t)
∏
k∈N\{n}
σks (h)
(
aˆk
)
.
Define wnσ (h)(an) to be w
vnσ
σ (h)(a
n). For any σ and player n the functions wnσ and vnσ have the
property that for every h ∈Hω the value vnσ (h) is equal to the expectation of wnσ (h)(·) taken over
all the actions of player n and for any action an by player n the value wnσ (h)(an) is equal to the
expectation of vnσ on the next stage following h, conditioned on the event that an was chosen. By
introducing intermediate stages of the filtration defined by the actions of player n the function vnσ
combined with the functions wnσ (h) define a martingale.
For every player n ∈ N and strategy profile σ , define the jump function jnσ :Hsω → R by
jnσ (h) = max
an∈Ans
∑
t∈S
χn(t)
∑
aˆ∈∏ Ak
ps
(aˆ,an)
(t)
∏
k∈N\{n}
σks (h)
(
aˆk
)
,k =n s
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jnσ :Hω → R in the natural way. With the definition of χn extended to a function on Hω so
that if h terminates at t then χn(h) is equal to χn(t), we have jnω(h) = maxan∈Ans wχ
n
σ (h)(a
n) for
all h ∈Hs .
The following definitions are generalizations of those found in [22,24–26], presented explic-
itly in [16].
Definitions. A strategy profile σ is -perfect if for every player n ∈ N there exists a function
rn :Hω → R and a subset B ⊆Hω of finite histories such that the probability of reaching Hω\B
with the strategies σ does not exceed  and for all players n ∈ N and all finite histories h ∈ B,
rn(h) jnσ (h)− ,∣∣rn(h)− vnσ (h)∣∣ , and
for all actions an chosen with positive probability by σn at h
∣∣wrnσ (h)(an)− rn(h)∣∣ .
The strategy profile σ is -self-perfect if for all players n the function rn is equal to the func-
tion vnσ . A stochastic game is perfect if there exists an -perfect strategy profile for every
positive  and self-perfect if there is an -self-perfect strategy profile for every positive .
The following result was proven in [16]: a normal stochastic game with approximate equilibria
is also perfect.
3. From perfection to approximate equilibria
3.1. The basic result
Definition. A function f :Hω → RN defined on the finite histories is called viable if for every
 > 0 and finite history h ∈Hω there is a strategy profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N) such that conditioned
on reaching the history h no player n can receive in expected payoff more than f (h)n +  from
any choice of an alternative strategy σˆ n played against the strategies (σ k | k = n) of the other
players.
A viable function is a generalization of an equilibrium payoff. From every state s let σs be an
equilibrium of the stochastic game that starts at the state s and for every player n ∈ N let gn(s)
be the expected payoff for player n of this equilibrium. Define f :Hω → RN by f (h)n := gn(s)
where s is the state at which h terminates. The function f is viable. Vice-versa, if f is viable
and σ is the strategy profile such that no player n can receive in expected payoff more than
f (h0)n+ from any choice of an alternative strategy σˆ n played against the strategies (σ k | k = n)
of the other players (where h0 = (sˆ) is the initial history of the game) and for every player n the
expected payoff from σ (with respect to the initial history h0) is within  of f (h0)n then σ would
be a 2-equilibrium of the game.
Viability describes what mutual punishment can accomplish. With only two players a function
is viable if and only if for every state s the function gives to each player at any history terminating
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simultaneously to their min-max value plus any arbitrary  > 0. However with three or more
players viability has a more complex structure. For example with three players the maximal
punishment of the first player by the second and third players may be highly beneficial to the
second player no matter what the first player does.
Define a strategy profile σ to be δ-viable if there is a viable function f such that vnσ (h) 
f (h)n − δ for every history h in Hω reached with positive probability according to μσ .
The topology on the infinite histories of play corresponds well to the definition of perfection
and to the definition of punishment strategies. The subsets in Oi for all finite stages i are both
open and closed sets. The condition that the history of play remains in a subset B of Hω cor-
responds to containment in the intersection of some subsets Bi in the respective Oi for all the
stages i; and the intersection of closed sets is a closed set. A decision to punish some player in
a deterministic way can be triggered only by the realization of one of a subset of finite histories,
and therefore such punishment is defined by a union of open sets, which is itself an open set.
Vice-versa, any open set is a union of sets of the form Oh for some finite histories h, and there-
fore for any infinite history contained in an open set there is a first stage i such that all infinite
stage extensions of the ith stage truncation belong to the open set. The regularity of μσ is very
useful for establishing that an -equilibria can be constructed from σ . For every positive  and
any measurable subset A of the infinite histories H∞ where “something goes wrong” there will
be an open set containing A of measure no more than  plus the measure of A that can define the
triggering of punishment strategies.
For example, suppose that the game has only one state, there are three players, the expected
payoffs are limit-average, and that at this state all three players should choose between two
actions, L and R, and all three should choose L or R according to the half–half probability
distribution at each stage. If some player chooses L at every stage up to and including the stage i
but will play half–half after stage i then because the game is limit average there will be no
difference in the expected payoff for all the players. On the other hand, if this player does choose
L at all stages of the game then the expected payoffs to the players, including the deviant player,
may be altered significantly. There will be no point in time where the other players can be certain
that this player is deviant, since for every stage i there will always be a small positive probability
that this player will choose L for all stages up to and including stage i. However (by the strong
law of large numbers) for every  > 0 there will be an open set of measure no more than  that
covers all the infinite histories where the payoffs of the players will differ from the expected
future payoffs. The players can agree to perform punishment strategies if and when this open
set is reached with certainty, and in this way approximate equilibria can be obtained, (given that
the expected payoffs from the suggested strategies are no worse than those from the punishment
strategies). A refinement of this approach for games with only one state (repeated games of
complete information) yielding an equilibrium rather than approximate equilibria is known as
the “Folk Theorem” (Rubinstein [14]).
For every player n, strategy profile σ , and finite history h = (s0, a0, . . . , si) ∈ Hω define
Wnσ (h) =
∑i−1
j=0(wnσ (hj )(anj ) − vnσ (hj )), where hj is the j stage truncation of h. The function
Wnσ represents the cumulative advantage in expected payoff obtained by player n through her
choice of actions (up to the stage defining the finite history) given that her future actions are
determined by the strategy σn.
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stochastic game such that for every player n the probability is no more than  that some finite
history h ∈Hω is reached with Wnσ (h) > , then the game has a 3(M|N | + 2)-equilibrium.
Proof. For every player j ∈ N define v¯jσ :H∞ → R by v¯jσ (h) = limi→∞ supvjσ (hi). As the
function vjσ :Hω → R defines a martingale, by the Martingale Convergence Theorem [27] this
limit equals the lim inf of the same expression almost everywhere. Furthermore v¯jσ equals Vj
almost everywhere with respect to μσ (an easy exercise using the regularity of μσ ), as their
integrals are equal on all open sets of positive measure (with respect to μσ ) and the distribution
μσ induced on H∞ is Borel.
Due to the regularity of μσ there is an open subset of H∞ of measure no more than
 + /(2|N |M) that contains all infinite histories where some finite truncation is outside of B
(defining the -perfection property) or where for some n ∈ N the values of vnσ do not converge or
v¯nσ does not equal the function Vn. We extend this to an open setA ofH∞ of probability no more
than (2 + |N |) that contains all infinite histories with finite truncations h where Wnσ (h) >  for
some n ∈ N .
Define the following strategies of the players. If any player n chooses an action that was not
given positive probability by σ then on the next following stage all other players hold player n
down to an expectation of no more than χn(s) +  for the rest of the game, where s is the
state on the following stage. (If two players do this simultaneously then punishment follows
according to any predetermined ordering of the players.) If h is the first finite history reached
which implies that any infinite extension of h must be in the open setA yet no player had chosen
an action given zero probability then the players perform according to strategies holding down
each player n to a future expectation of no more than f (h)n+ where the f is the viable function
with vnσ (h′) f (h′)n −  for all n ∈ N and finite histories h′ reached with positive probability.
Otherwise the players follow the strategies σ . Let σˆ stand for this strategy profile . Due to the
unlikelihood of reaching the set A we have vn
σˆ
(h0) vnσ (h0)− (2 + |N |)M for every player n,
(where h0 ∈H0 is the initial history).
Define σ¯ to be the strategy profile where player n chooses some alternative strategy σ¯ n and the
other players stay with their strategies as defined by σˆ . Define a stop rule t on the infinite histo-
riesH∞ by t (h) being the first stage where all infinite history extensions must belong to the open
setA or t (h) being the next stage following the first stage when player n chooses a strategy given
zero probability. Otherwise if neither occurs let t (h) be infinite. For any infinite history h and
its ith stage truncation hi define two functions g˜ni , g
n
i :Hi → R by gni (hi) = vnσ (hi) − Wnσ (hi)
and g˜ni (hi) = vnσ (hi) if t (h) > i and otherwise gni (h) = f (ht(h))n − Wnσ (ht(h)) − 2 and
g˜ni (h) = f (ht(h))n + 2 if t (h)  i and t (h) is the first stage implying that A must be reached
in the future but before stage t (h) player n had not chosen an action given zero probability or
gni (h) = χn(st (h))−Wnσ (ht(h)−1)− 2 and g˜ni (h) = χn(st (h))+ 2 if t  i and on stage t (h)− 1
player n had chosen an action given zero probability (and st (h) is the state at stage t (h)). By
assumption the functions gni define a supermartingale (non-increasing averages) with respect to
the distribution μσ¯ . The functions g˜ni are never more than the g
n
i + 6. Both functions gni and g˜ni
converge everywhere to Borel measurable functions gn :H∞ → R and g˜n :H∞ → R, the former
because a supermartingale is defined [27] and the latter because the stop time t is defined using
an open set A that covers all points in H∞ where vnσ does not converge or the limit v¯nσ does not
equal the payoff function Vn. Furthermore, the expectation Vn(σ¯ ) does not exceed the expecta-
tion of g˜n. As the gni is a supermartingale we must conclude that the expectation of gn does not
exceed that of vnσ (h0) [27], and that concludes the proof. 
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The difficulty of Question 1 lies with determining whom is to be punished. Given that A
is an open subset of infinite histories covering all of the finite histories which should trigger
punishment, the relevant question is “who is responsible for steering the game toward the set A”
(and therefore should be punished)? Without the viability of the strategies, player n may want
to steer the game toward A in such a way that often player k appears to be more responsible
for entering the set A, even though player k was adhering faithfully to her part of the suggested
strategy profile σ . If the stochastic game is structured in a sufficiently simple way, viability may
be unnecessary. As we will see below, the viability property can be dropped for quitting games.
3.2. Discrete decision processes
Let X be a countable or finite set. For every x ∈ X let Yx be a countable or finite set, with
Y :=⋃x∈X Yx . For every x ∈ S there is a transition law px ∈ Δ(Yx) and for every y ∈ Yx there
is a transition law py ∈ Δ(X). The process starts at some fixed xˆ ∈ X at stage 0 and on the even
stages i = 0,2,4, . . . the process is in X and on the odd stages the process is in Y . There is a
function v :X ∪ Y → R such that for every y ∈ Yx v(y) is the expectation of v(x) on the next
stage following y and v(x) is the expectation of v(y) on the next stage following x. We assume
that v is uniformly bounded, with M  1 a bound on the greatest difference between any two
values of v. The structure described above is called a discrete decision process.
The interpretation of a discrete decision process is as follows. There is an agent choosing the
actions in Yx . The agent receives as a payoff the lim-sup of the function v on the path of states
in X. Given that the agent chooses elements in Y according to the time independent Markovian
strategy defined by the px at any state the function v will represent the agent’s future expected
payoff (since by the uniform bound for v and the Martingale Convergence Theorem there will be
convergence almost everywhere [27]). We presume that the agent will follow the given strategy,
but we will imagine what could happen if the agent chose to follow a different strategy.
The connection to stochastic games is direct. Let j be a player in a normal stochastic game.
Given any strategy profile σ a discrete decision process for player j is defined by extending the
state space so that X =Hω . Define Yh to be only those actions in Ajs (h terminating at s) chosen
with positive probability at h. Because every state in the new expanded state space is encountered
at most once, time independent Markovian strategies are well defined, in addition to a function
v derived from the vjσ on the set X =Hω of finite histories and from the wjσ (h) on the actions
in Yh. Also a discrete decision process for player j may be defined by any partition P of the
finite histories that is equal to or finer than the partition {Hx | x ∈ S} such that for all h,h′ in the
same partition member P ∈P it follows that vjσ (h) = vjσ (h′), σ j (h) = σ j (h′) and for any choice
a ∈ Ajs of action (where both h and h′ terminate at s) the distribution on P on the next stage of
play induced by the choice of a is the same for h or h′. In such a case the partition P = X is the
state space of a well defined discrete decision process. When this occurs the resulting discrete
decision process for player j is generated by the stochastic game and the strategy profile σ . We
get the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corrolary 1. If for 0 <   1 and a normal stochastic game there is a strategy profile σ that is
-self-perfect, -viable, and for every player j a discrete decision process is generated such that
the probability does not exceed  that there is an l with
∑l
i=0,2,...(v(yi+1)− v(xi))  then the
stochastic game has a 3(M|N | + 2)-equilibrium.
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i=0,2,... |v(yi+1)− v(xi)|.
Notice that discrete decision processes and the functions w¯ involve no loss of generality from
Markov chains and the total variation of a martingale defined on them. Given a Markov chain,
we could define Yx so that there is a bijection between Yx and the states that follow x with
positive probability, and then for every y ∈ Yx define the distribution py to be the appropriate
Dirac mass.
Definition. A discrete decision process is -balanced if for all states x ∈ X and y ∈ Yx it follows
that |v(y)− v(x)| .
Proposition 1. Assume that a discrete decision process is δ-balanced, that the expectation of
w¯(p) does not exceed a positive B and positive δ is less than or equal to 2ρ/B for some positive
pair ,ρ. Then the probability does not exceed ρ that there exists an l with |∑li=0,2,...(v(yi+1)−
v(xi))| .
Proof. The Doob submartingale inequality states that if (Si | i = 0,1, . . . , n) is a martingale
with zero expectation then for every n 0, positive value c > 0 and exponent p  1 the proba-
bility does not exceed E(|Sn|p)/cp that maxin |Si | > c [27, Section 14.6]. Since the martingale
property implies that E(S2n) is equal to the sum over all the stages 1 i  n of the E(s2i ) where
si = Si −Si−1 is the change in value between the (i−1)st stage and the ith stage, we can re-write
it as
Probability
(
max
in
|Si | > 
)
<
1
2
E
(
n∑
i=1
s2i
)
.
In the context of a discrete decision process, for every i = 0,2, . . . define the random variable ri
to be v(yi+1) − v(xi), and for every i = 0,2, . . . let Ri be the sum of the rk for the even k  i.
The process Ri is a martingale with zero expectation and so for every non-negative even integer
Q and non-negative even integer i less than or equal to Q
Probability
(
max
iQ
|Ri | > 
)
<
1
2
E
( ∑
i=0,2,...,Q
r2i
)
.
By taking the limit as Q goes to infinity and δ  |ri | we get
Probability
(
max
i<∞ |Ri | > 
)
<
1
2
E
(∑
i<∞
r2i
)
 δ 1
2
E
(∑
i<∞
|ri |
)
 δB/2.
The conclusion follows from the size of δ. 
For all even i  2 and infinite path p = (x0, y1, . . .) or finite path p = (x0, y1, . . . , xk) in
a discrete decision process with k  i define Wi(p) :=∑j=0,2,...,i (v(yj−1)− v(xj−2)). As with
the function Wnσ defined by a strategy profile σ in stochastic games, Wi measures the cumulative
advantage obtained by the decision maker up to the stage i.
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Given a discrete decision process, for any subset A ⊆ X, x ∈ A and any y ∈ Yx define
rA(y) ∈ R to be the expected value of v conditioned on the next visit to A and the use of y.
Formally, consider the process such that x is the initial state, the action y is chosen at x, and at
all subsequent stages the actions are chosen according to the given time independent distribu-
tions. Let qAy be the probability that this process returns to the set A at some stage after the initial
stage and for every z ∈ A let qA,zy be the probability that this return does occur and happens
first at the state z. If qAy is positive then define rAy :=
∑
z∈A q
A,z
y v(z)
qAy
and otherwise define rAy to be
anything between some upper and lower bounds for the function v.
Definitions. A state x ∈ X of a discrete decision process is varied if there exists some y ∈ Yx
such that v(y) = v(x). The rank of a discrete decision process is the minimal number n such
that the varied states can be partitioned into n subsets A1, . . . ,An with the property that for
every k = 1,2, . . . , n and every x ∈ Ak there is a real number rAkx such that for every y ∈ Yx the
quantity rAky is equal to rAkx .
Proposition 2. If a discrete decision process has rank n then the expectation of w¯ does not
exceed 2nM .
Proof. For every subset A = Ak and x ∈ A let lx be the probability that the last visit to A occurs
at x, let mx be the probability that there is no return to A from a start at x, and let ni(x) be
the probability that x is the state on the ith stage. We have lx =∑i ni(x)mx , ∑x∈A lx  1, and
mx =∑y∈Yx (1 − qAy )px(y).
Because the transitions are Markovian and time independent we have v(y) = qAy rAx + (1 −
qAy )sy for some sy whose difference from rAx does not exceed M , and therefore |v(y) − rAx | 
M(1 − qAy ).
Next consider the quantity |rAx − v(x)|. The equality v(x) =
∑
y∈Yx p
x(y)v(y) =∑
y∈Yx p
x(y) · ((1 − qAy )sy + qAy rAx ) implies v(x) − rAx =
∑
y∈Yx p
x(y)(1 − qAy )(sy − rAx ) and
|v(x)− rAx |Mmx .
By the triangle inequality |v(y) − v(x)| |v(y) − rAx | + |rAx − v(x)|. By mx =
∑
yinYx
(1 −
qAy )p
x(y) the contribution to w¯ in the set A = Ak does not exceed 2M∑i∑x∈A ni(x)mx , which
is no more than 2M . 
The following example shows that the conclusion of Proposition 2 must be dependent on the
rank or on some similar concept.
Example 1. The set X has 2n+ 1 states, namely x−n, x−n+1, . . . , x0, . . . , xn−1, xn. Assume that
|Yx−n | = |Yxn | = 1 and that the state on the next stage following any visit to x−n is again x−n
and the same holds for the state xn. Define v(−n) to be −1 and v(n) to be 1. The process starts
at x0 and for every i strictly between −n and n there are two elements of Yxi , namely L and R.
If L is chosen then the process moves to the state xi−1 with certainty and if R is chosen then
the process moves to the state xi+1 with certainty. At every state strictly between x−n and xn the
actions L and R are both chosen with 1/2 probability. Extend v to a function v :X → [−1,1]
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one can make n large enough so that δ is less than 1
n
. However from a start at the position 0 the
probability that Wi will reach 1 for some i will be exactly 1/2. By Kolmogorov’s inequality (the
one state version of the Doob submartingale inequality) with probability at least 1/2 the process
will avoid −n and n for at least n22 stages, implying that the expectation of w¯ will be at least n2 .
3.4. Chain reduction
We would like to exploit Proposition 2 in combination with Corollary 1. We look for any way
to reduce our discrete decision process to that of fewer states so that the rank could go down but
the distribution of supi Wi does not change significantly.
In some cases the decisions made in a subset A of states can be represented equivalently as
decisions made at a single state. This happens if there is some special state s such that the first
visit to the subset A ∪ {s} is always at the state s and there is a finite m such that from any state
in A before m stages occur, regardless of the choice of actions, the process leaves the set A. As
any element of A could be encountered at most once before reaching s again, the probability
distributions on the Yx for all the x ∈ A ∪ {s} can be represented by probability distributions on
the set Y ′s = ×x∈A∪{s}Yx [6].
However a reduction of such a subset A ∪ {s} to the single state s could present problems
for applying Corollary 1. If a player should be punished for striving to attain a higher payoff,
should that player be punished for the actions actually made or for the actions in Y ′s? The Y ′s may
define counter-factual behavior, meaning that many different “actions” in Y ′s may generate the
same seen behavior. On the other hand, the variance of the Wi may be considerably higher with
the actions from the original discrete decision process than from such a reduction.
Definitions. A subset B of non-varied states of a discrete decision process is removable if from
any visit to a state in B the probability of leaving the set B at some future stage is one. Define two
disjoint subsets S and T to be chain reducible if T is removable, for every s ∈ S there is a subset
As ⊆ X not containing s such that every visit to the set As ∪ {s} starts at s, there is a positive
integer m such that from any start in As there are at most m visits to As\T , and furthermore for
every x in As\T and any y ∈ Yx either with probability one the first state reached in X\T is not
in As or there is a state n(y) in As\T such that if y is chosen then with probability one n(y) is
the first state reached in X\T . An action y ∈ Ax with x ∈ As\T such that with probability one
the next state in X\T is not in As is called a completing action. If S and T are chain reducible
then define a new discrete decision process with the new state space X\(T ⋃s∈S As) and for
every s ∈ S the action space Y s is defined to be {(y0, y1, . . . , yk) | y0 ∈ Ys, ∀ 0 i < k yi+1 ∈
Yn(yi ) and yk is completing}. The new discrete decision process is called a chain reduction of the
original discrete decision process.
Lemma 1. If a chain reduction of a discrete decision process is δ-balanced for some positive
δ then for every positive  the probability of supi Wi of the original discrete decision process
exceeding  + δ is not greater than the probability of the same expression exceeding  for the
chain reduction.
Proof. Let x0, y1, x2, . . . , xi, yi+1 be any sequence in the original discrete decision process. It
can be broken down to (x0, . . . , yn1−1), (xn1 , yn1+1, . . . yn2−1), . . . , (xnk , . . . xi, yi+1) where the
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the properties of the chain reduction
∑
j=nl,...,nl+1−2(v(yj+1) − v(xj )) = v(y) − v(xnl ), where
y ∈ Yxnl is the action from the chain reduction corresponding to the subsequence of actions
in (Axnl ∪ {xnl })\T starting at ynl+1. Therefore it suffices for any sequence x0, y1, . . . , xl, yl+1
with x0 ∈ S and x1, . . . , xl ∈ Ax0 that
∑
j=0,2,...,l(v(yj+1) − v(xj )) δ. Complete x0, . . . , yl+1
to any x0, . . . , yl+1, xl+2, . . . , xk, yk+1 with yk+1 completing, and
∑
j=l+2,l+4,...,k(v(yj+1) −
v(xj )) 0. By the δ balanced property it follows that
∑
j=0,2,...,l (v(yj+1)− v(xj )) δ. 
Theorem 2. If for a normal stochastic game there is a positive integer k such that for every
positive  there is a strategy profile σ that is -self-perfect, -viable and for every player there is
a generated discrete decision process with a chain reduction that is -balanced of rank no more
than k then the game has approximate equilibria.
Proof. It follows from Corollary 1, Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 1. 
A chain reduction can result in a dramatic drop in the expectation of w¯, a reason why Theo-
rem 2 has a complicated formulation.
Example 2. The set X consists of x0, x1, . . . , xn and b. At the states b and xn the sets Yb and
Yxn have only one element and the result of this action is return to these respective states with
certainty. Define v(b) to be 1 and v(xn) to be −1. At every 0  i  n − 1 the set Yxi consists
of the two elements L and R. If L is chosen then with probability 12n−1 there is motion to the
state b and with probability 2n−22n−1 there is motion to the state x0. If R is chosen then there is
motion with certainty to the state xi+1. At every state xi with 0  i  n − 1 the actions L and
R are chosen both with 1/2 probability. By induction one can prove that v(xi) = 1−2i2n−1 (with
v(x0) = 0). The discrete decision process can be chain reduced to the three states x0, xn, and b
with Ax0 = {x1, . . . , xn−1}. The probability of not returning to x0 from a start at x0 is 12n−1 , with
half of this probability resulting in a move to b and the other half to a move to xn. The expectation
on w¯ in the chain reduction is 1, as the number of expected visits to x0 is 2n−1 and at each visit
to x0 there is a probability of 12n−1 of the function v changing by exactly a value of 1. However
in the original discrete decision process the expected number of visits to xi is 2−i2n−1 and the
expected change in v from one visit to the state xi is 2
i
2n−1 , and hence
2n−1
2n−1 from all visits to xi .
This implies that the expectation on w¯ is at least n2 .
3.5. Markov chains and total variation
Let X be the finite state space of a Markov chain and v :X × {0,1, . . .} → [0,1] a function
such that for every x ∈ X on stage i the value v(x, i) is the expectation of v(·, i+1) on stage i+1.
For any infinite path p = (x0, x1, . . .) in X define the quantity w¯(p) =∑∞i=0 |v(xi+1, i + 1) −
v(xi, i)|.
Lemma 2. If the Markov chain is time homogeneous then the expected value of the function w¯ is
no more than |X|.
Proof. For every x ∈ X define qx to be the probability that starting at x the process will not
return to x in the future. The contribution to w¯ at the state x will not exceed qx times the number
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(1 − qx)2 + · · · = 1/qx . 
Conjecture 1. Without the time homogeneous assumption the expected value of the function w¯
is no more than |X|.
The Markovian property is critical to Conjecture 1; it is easy to find counter examples if the
transitions and the function are dependent on the past history. The main difficulty with Conjec-
ture 1 lies with the lack of a state identity that transcends the stages. We would be satisfied if the
expectation of w¯ does not exceed f (n)|X| for any function f : {1,2, . . .} → R that is independent
of the choice of Markov chain.
4. Quitting games
4.1. The definition
In a quitting game each player has only two actions, c for continue and q for quit. As soon as
one or more of the players at any stage chooses q, the game stops and the players receive their
payoffs, which are determined by the subset of players that choose simultaneously the action q.
If nobody chooses the action q throughout all stages of play, then all players receive 0.
Let N be the set of players. A strategy profile for the players is a sequence of probability
vectors (pi | i = 0,1,2, . . .) such that for every stage i pi ∈ [0,1]N . pji stands for the probability
that player j will stop the game (with the action q) at stage i conditioned on the event that stage i
is reached. With 0 standing for the origin, 0 ∈ [0,1]N means that all players choose the action c
with certainty.
The payoffs are defined as follows. For every non-empty subset A ⊆ N of players there is
a payoff vector v(A) ∈ RN . At the first stage that any player chooses the action q and A is the
non-empty subset of players that choose q at this stage, the players receive the payoff v(A). This
means that player i receives v(A)i ∈ R. Let M  1 be an upper bound on the difference between
all payoffs.
A quitting game is a limit average stochastic game. Let xˆ be the state at the start and at any
stage such that at all previous stages all players had chosen c. At the state xˆ the payoffs are zero
for all players. We define 2|N | − 1 additional states sA corresponding to the non-empty subsets
A of N such that sA is reached from xˆ if A is the set of players who chose q on the same stage.
Once any of these states sA is reached then no matter what the players do the game remains at
this state forever and the players receive the corresponding payoffs v(A) on this and all following
stages.
4.2. Correspondences and orbits
By a correspondence F :X → Y we mean any subset F of X × Y . If X0 is a subset of X then
F ∩ (X0 × Y) is called the restriction of F to X0 and denoted by F | X0. For every x ∈ X define
F(x) := {y | (x, y) ∈ F }. It is not assumed a priori that F(x) = ∅ for all or any particular x ∈ X.
The domain of a correspondence F is the subset {x | F(x) = ∅} and the image of F is the subset
{y | y ∈ F(x) for some x ∈ X}.
If F :X → X is a correspondence then an infinite orbit of the correspondence F is an infinite
sequence (x0, x1, . . .) of points of X such that for every non-negative integer n  0 we have
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all 0 n < l. An extended orbit of F is a sequence (sj | 0 j < L) of sequences sj = (xj,i | 0
i < nj ), possibly with L = ∞ or nj = ∞ for some or all j < L, such that xj,i+1 ∈ F(xj,i) for
every i + 1 < nj and if nj = ∞ then limk→∞ xj,k = xj+1,0 and otherwise xj,nj−1 = xj+1,0. The
extended orbit has bounded total variation if
∑
j<L
∑
i<nj
‖xj,i − xj,i−1‖ < ∞, and otherwise
it has unbounded total variation.
Returning to quitting games, for every r ∈ RN let Γr be the one stage game where player
j ∈ N receives the payoff rj if all players choose the action c.
For every r ∈ RN and p ∈ [0,1]N , let aj (p) be the expected payoff for player j if she chooses
q simultaneously with the strategies (pk | k = j) and let bj (r,p) be the expected payoff for
player j from the action c in the game Γr , given that the other players choose the strategies
(pk | k = j), meaning that she will receive the payoff rj if everyone chooses the action c. One
can calculate aj (p) and bj (r,p) easily. We have
aj (p) =
∑
A⊆N\{j}
v
(
A∪ {j})j ∏
k∈A
pk
∏
k =j, k /∈A
(
1 − pk)
and
bj (r,p) = rj
∏
k =j
(
1 − pk)+ ∑
∅=A⊆N\{j}
v(A)j
∏
k∈A
pk
∏
k =j, k /∈A
(
1 − pk).
Every strategy profile p = (pi | i = 0,1,2, . . .) defines payoff vectors ri(p) ∈ RN for all
i = 0,1,2, . . . such that rji (p) is the expected payoff for player j from the strategy profile
(pi,pi+1, . . .), equivalent to the payoff conditioned on all players choosing c before the stage i.
Define a function q : [0,1]N → [0,1] by q(p) := 1 −∏j∈N(1 − pj ). The function q is the
probability that at least one player chooses the action q .
We will consider the correspondences generated by moving backward from some stage i + 1
to stage i through an approximate equilibrium of the one stage game. For any   0 we define
correspondences E ⊆ RN × [0,1]N and F ⊆ RN × RN :
E(r) :=
{
p ∈ [0,1]N | pj > 0 ⇒ aj (p) bj (p, r)− ,
pj < 1 ⇒ bj (p, r) aj (p)− }.
For every r ∈ RN and p ∈ [0,1]N define a new member of RN , namely
f (r,p) := r
∏
j∈N
(
1 − pj )+ ∑
∅=A⊂N
v(A)
∏
j∈A
pj
∏
j /∈A
(
1 − pj ),
the expected payoffs in the game Γr when the players choose p. We define F by F(r) :=
{f (r,p) | p ∈ E(r)}.
4.3. Normal players, instant and stationary equilibria
Definitions. A vector r ∈ RN is feasible if it is in the convex hull of {v(A) | ∅ = A ⊆ N} ∪ {0}.
For every player n ∈ N define χj to be χj (xˆ) where xˆ is the initial state. A vector r ∈ RN
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v({n})n  χn. The vector v ∈ RN is defined by vi := v({i})i for every player i.
Lemma 3. If j is an abnormal player then vj < 0 and v({i})j  χj for every i = j .
Proof. Consider what happens when every other player chooses c with certainty at every stage.
Player j could respond by choosing q at any stage. vj < χj implies that never choosing q must
be at least as good as χj , meaning that vj < χj  0.
Let δ > 0 be given, and consider what happens when player i chooses q with a probability
of δ at every stage of play (and all other players choose c with certainty). By quitting at any
stage player j would receive no more than vj + δM , and for small enough δ this would be worse
than χj . It follows that choosing c at all stages must be the better choice for player j , implying
that v({i})j  χj . 
Lemma 4. Let p0,p1, . . . , pk−1 be a sequence of one-stage strategies in [0,1]N such that 0 <
ρ < 1 and ρ = 1−∏k−1j=0(1−q(pj )) is the probability that some player chooses q on some stage
and let s0, . . . , sk be a sequence of vectors in RN such that sj = f (sj−1,pj−1) for each 1 
j  k. If ‖s0 − sk‖  δ then the strategy profile p = (pk−1,pk−2, . . . , p0,pk−1, . . . , p0, . . .) =
(p¯0, p¯1, . . .) generates a sequence ri(p) for i = 0,1, . . . such that ‖ri(p) − snk−i‖  δρ for all
(n− 1)k < i  nk and if pj ∈ E(sj ) for all j = 0,1, . . . , k − 1 then p¯i ∈ E+ δ
ρ
(ri+1(p)) for all
i = 0,1, . . . .
Proof. Define r ∈ RN to be the payoffs to the players conditioned on the event that some
player chose q from the strategies pk−1, . . . , p0 (starting with pk−1). We have assumed that
sk = (1 − ρ)s0 + ρr . With ‖s0 − sk‖ < δ and ρ(r − s0) = sk − s0 we have ‖r − s0‖ δ/ρ. With
rnk(p) = r for all multiples nk of k and by working backwards from rnk(p) to r(n−1)k+1(p)
we have ‖ri(p) − snk−i‖  δ/ρ for all (n − 1)k < i  nk. The last claim follows from
|bn(r,p) − bn(s,p)|  ‖r − s‖ for all vectors r, s ∈ RN , players n ∈ N and probabilities
p ∈ [0,1]N . 
Definitions. A quitting game has stationary approximate equilibria if for every  > 0 there is
a p ∈ [0,1]N such that (p,p,p, . . .) is an -equilibrium. A quitting game has instant approxi-
mate equilibria if for every  > 0 there is a p ∈ [0,1]N with pj = 1 for some player j ∈ N such
that a 2-equilibrium is described by the behavior p on the first stage followed by punishment
of player j on the second stage (given that she did not quit) yielding to player j no more than
χj + .
Lemma 5. If a quitting game has neither stationary approximate equilibria nor instant approxi-
mate equilibria then
(1) vl > 0 for some normal player l ∈ N and for every normal player j there is another
normal player k such that v({j})k < vk ,
(2) there is an 0 < ρ  1 small enough so that if r ∈ RN is a ρ-rational vector, p ∈ Eρ(r)
and y = f (r,p) then
(a) ρq(p) ‖x − y‖ and
(b) q(p) 1 − ρ.
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(1) If vl  0 for all players l ∈ N then all players choosing c on all stages would be an
equilibrium; and by Lemma 3 any player l with vl > 0 must be a normal player.
Furthermore, if there were not such a second player k, normal or abnormal, then with  > 0
fixed player j choosing q at every stage with probability small enough would describe an
-equilibrium. Furthermore, by Lemma 3 this player k must be normal.
(2) Let ((ri , si ,pi) | i = 1,2, . . .) be a sequence such that pi is a member of E1/i(ri) with
si = f (ri,pi), rji  χj − 1/i for all j ∈ N and either (a) q(pi )i > ‖ri − si‖ or (b) q(pi) > 1 − 1i .
Let 0 <   1 be arbitrary and choose any i large enough so that i|N | > (3M + 2)|N |. Let rˆi
be the vector in RN representing the expected payoffs of the players from the stationary strategy
profile p = (pi,pi,pi, . . .).
(a) Assume that q(p)
i
> ‖ri − si‖. By Lemma 4 ‖rˆi − ri‖ /2 and therefore pi is in E(rˆi).
With  arbitrary there would be stationary approximate equilibria.
(b) Assume that q(pi) > 1− 1i . For some player n the quantity pn is at least 1− /(3M +2).
Define pˆ to be the strategy profile such that pˆj = pj if j = n and otherwise pˆn = 1. It follows
that pˆ along with punishment of player n for not quitting describes an -equilibrium. With 
arbitrary there would be instant approximate equilibria. 
4.4. Equivalences
Proposition 3 is a generalization of a result of Solan and Vieille [22, Proposition 2.6], with the
main improvement being that the fourth power replaces the sixth power.
Proposition 3. Let 0 <   1 be given and let positive δ be less than 42M3 . A strategy profile
p = (p0,p1, . . .) with all the ri(p) -rational, ∑∞i=0 q(pi) = ∞ and ri(p) ∈ Fδ(ri+1(p)) for all
i = 0,1, . . . generates a 3-equilibrium.
Proof. For all i  1 and players n ∈ N define Wni to be the summation
∑i−1
k=0(bn(rnk+1(p),pk)−
rnk (p)), the cumulative advantage in expectation that player n has obtained by choosing the action
c on all stages up to but not including the stage i, conditioned on the event that no other player
has chosen q . For every player n define i∗n to be the first stage i where Wni is at least . For every
player n ∈ N and stage i  1 define cni to be
∏i−1
k=0(1 −pnk ). Define in to be the first stage i such
that cni is no more than

M
.
We must determine whom to punish and when. Define iˆ to be minn∈N(i∗n, i

n). If iˆ is equal
to in for some n ∈ N , then define nˆ ∈ N to be any n ∈ N with iˆ = in. Otherwise if iˆ is less than
i

n for all n ∈ N then define nˆ to be any n ∈ N such that iˆ is equal to i∗n . Before the stage iˆ the
players perform according to p. If the game reaches stage iˆ then player nˆ will be punished such
that the expected future payoff for this player is no more than χnˆ + /10.
Because the decision to choose q terminates the game immediately, and the one stage ad-
vantage by doing so never exceeds 4/(2M3), the only deviant strategy we need to consider is
the repetitive decision to choose c by a player. Due to iˆ  i∗
nˆ
and that the vectors are -rational,
there is no advantage beyond 3 for player nˆ to choose c repetitively. Likewise from iˆ  i∗m for
all players m ∈ N we need only consider the advantage to a player m = nˆ from the punishment
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punishing nˆ) is reached with a probability of no more than /M .
Case 1 (iˆ < i
nˆ
and iˆ = i∗
nˆ
). We look at the discrete decision process for player nˆ generated by
the stochastic game and the given profile of strategies. Let si be the state representing the history
on the ith stage of play where every player has chosen c at every stage up until i. Notice that
the distribution on the next visit to {s0, s1, . . .} from si is the same for both actions, namely total
weight given to the state si+1, (for the action q this holds because there is a zero probability of
returning to the set). Therefore for player nˆ the generated discrete decision process has rank 1.
By Propositions 1 and 2 the probability does not exceed 2/(M2) that the stage iˆ is reached. As
cm
iˆ
 /M if player m never quits the probability of reaching iˆ is still no more than /M .
Case 2 (iˆ = i
nˆ
). Whether or not player m or any other player other than nˆ refuses to choose q the
probability of player nˆ not choosing q before stage iˆ does not exceed /M . 
Theorem 3. For a quitting game with neither stationary approximate equilibria nor instant ap-
proximate equilibria the following are equivalent:
(i) the game has approximate equilibria,
(ii) for every positive  there is a cyclic strategy profile p = (p0, . . . , pk−1,p0, . . .) with
ri(p) ∈ F(ri+1(p)) for all i = 0,1, . . ., all the ri are -rational, and q(pi) is positive for some
0 i  k − 1,
(iii) for every positive  and every B > 1 there is a finite orbit of F of -rational vectors
within a distance of  of the feasible vectors with a total variation of at least B ,
(iv) for every positive  there is an infinite orbit of F of -rational vectors with unbounded
total variation,
(v) for every positive  there is an infinite extended orbit of F of -rational vectors with
unbounded total variation.
Remark. That (iv) implies both (i) and (ii) was proven by Solan and Vieille [22] in the context
of vj > 0 for all players j ∈ N . Solan [20] showed that the minimal length of the cycle in (ii)
may depend on the size of .
Proof. That (ii) implies (i) is proven by Proposition 3. That (ii) implies (iii), (iv) and (v) is trivial
and that (iv) implies (v) is also trivial.
(iv) implies (iii): As the orbit has unbounded variation, any cluster point of the orbit must be
feasible.
(iii) implies (ii): Let  > 0 be fixed. By the fact that the feasible and /5 rational vectors form
a compact set there will be a B be large enough so that any finite orbit of F/5 of total variation at
least B will have two vectors si and sj in the sequence separated by a total variation of at least 2M
such that ‖si − sj‖ < /5. With i < j the si and sj are separated by strategies pj ,pj−1, . . . , pi+1
giving a probability of at least 1/2 that q was chosen. (ii) follows from Lemma 4.
(i) implies (iii): We prove the contrapositive. Assume that there does exist a positive δ < 1 and
a bound B > 1 such that every orbit of Fδ of vectors that are feasible and δ-rational has a total
variation less than B . Without loss of generality we assume that δ is less than the ρ given by
Lemma 5. Also by Lemma 5 this case can be re-formulated: there is a 0 < d  1/2 such that
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vectors that are feasible and δ-rational is created from a strategy profile where the probability
that all players choose c on all stages is at least θ . Assume that p = (p0,p1, . . .) is a δθρd/(6M)
equilibrium. We must assume that the probability according to p of no player ever quitting is
no more than δθρ/4 (otherwise a stage is reached where the future probability of some player
quitting is less than d/(10M) and player j can gain at the next stage at least 9d/10 by quitting
alone, and therefore gain by an expectation of at least δθpd/5 for the whole game). This means
that there must be a stage i where the probability of no player ever quitting before reaching i
is between θρ/3 and θ/3. Since we have a δθρd/(6M)-equilibrium the steps from stage 0 to
stage i generate a finite orbit of Fδ of δ-rational and feasible vectors, a contradiction.
(v) implies (ii): We assume the existence of an extended orbit ((xl,j | 0 l < Q), j < nl) of
F/3 with unbounded total variation in {x | ∀j xj  χj − /3}. Let pl,i be the corresponding
strategies in [0,1]N such that xl,i+1 = f (xl,i , pl,i ).
Case 1 (There is a sequence (xl,0, xl,1, . . .) such that
∑∞
i=0 ‖xl,i − xl,i+1‖ = ∞). This implies
(iii), and we have proven already that (iii) implies (ii).
Case 2 (∑∞i=0 ‖xl,i − xl,i+1‖ < ∞ for every l < ∞). Let x be any cluster point of the sequence
(x0,0, x1,0, . . .). Let xm,0 and xn,0 be any two points in this sequence such that both are within
/5 of x and
∏
m<l<n
∏
i<nl
(1 − q(pl,i)) < 30M . We can assume without loss of generality
that for every l the total variation in the lth orbit is Tl > 0. For every m  i  n − 1 define ki
large enough so that the total variation from xi,ki to xi+1.0 does not exceed ρ2−iTi . Lemma 4
implies that (ii) holds with the cyclic strategy profile obtained from reversing the probabilities
to pn−1,kn−1−1, . . . , pn−1,0,pn−2,kn−2−1, . . . , p1,0,p0,k0−1, . . . , p0,0, and then repeating indefi-
nitely. 
Lemma 6. Assume that all players are normal, that 0 <   1, that there are neither stationary
nor instant approximate equilibria, and s ∈ F2/(2M)(r). If rn  χn − 3 then sn  χn − 3 and
if rn < χn − 3 then sn  rn + 2/(2M).
Proof. Suppose that the conclusion of the lemma does not hold. In either case it must hold that
sn < χn −3 + 2/(2M), meaning also that bn(p, r) and an(p) are less than χn −3 + 2/M 
χn − 2. As player n can get at least χn from quitting alone we must also assume that the
total probability that other players are quitting according to p must exceed 2/M . Let d be the
expected payoff for player n if this player never quits and the other players behave according to
p on every stage of play. Since an(p) is less than χn − 2 if d is also less than χn then p would
be a way to hold player n down to a payoff less than χn, a contradiction. The value bn(p, r) is
a convex combination of rn and d . rn  d with bn(p, r) < χn implies that d is also less than χn,
a contradiction to the definition of χn. With rn < d it follows that χn − 2 > bn(r,p)  rn.
If we can show that bn(r,p)  rn + 2
M
then by Lemma 4 the value d must be no more than
rn + /2  χn − 3/2, again a contradiction to the definition of χn. bn(r,p) < rn + 2
M
now
follows either from the assumption sn < rn + 22M or from the assumptions rn  χn − 3 and
sn < χn − 3. 
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stationary approximate equilibria then the quitting game has approximate equilibria if and only
if for every positive δ there is an infinite orbit of Fδ of unbounded total variation.
5. Escape games
5.1. The definition
Define the set Wj := {r | rj  vj } and define W := ⋃j∈N Wj = {r | rj  vj for some
j ∈ N} = RN\{r | rj > vj for all j ∈ N}.
A quitting game is an escape game if
(1) every player is normal (vn = v({n})n  χn for all n ∈ N ), and there is a closed subset
Q of RN within a distance of 1 of the feasible vectors and a positive ¯ > 0 with the following
existence and closure properties:
(2) Q∩ ∂W = ∅ and for every x ∈ Q∩ ∂W there is a y with yj > vj for all j ∈ N such that
the closed line segment from x to y is in the set Q,
(3) if x ∈ Q\W then any payoff vector y ∈ RN in F0(x) with y = x satisfies yj > vj + ¯ for
all j ∈ N ,
(4) if x ∈ Q and y ∈ F¯(x) then y ∈ Q.
The name “escape” reflects the assumption that once one has left the set {x | xj  vj + ¯
for some j} with the correspondence F0 | Q then one has also “escaped” this set for good.
5.2. The spanning property
For any subset C of a topological space let C¯ denote its topological closure and ∂C its bound-
ary.
We use a property for correspondences called the “spanning” property, defined in [18] but used
implicitly in [17]. The homology used in these articles is the Cech homology with coefficients
in a non-trivial compact Abelian group. This approach was chosen because the Cech homology
is defined using approximations [1] and hence many properties are preserved when passing to
limits. Because the approximation arguments of this article are made explicit, we could use in-
stead the more conventional homology groups defined by continuous maps from simplicies to
the topological spaces (and with integer coefficients).
An n-dimensional compact manifold with boundary is a topological space such that every
point is contained in a subset of the space topologically equivalent to the n-dimensional disk Dn
with this point either in the center or on the boundary of this disk.
If C is an n-dimensional compact manifold with boundary in Rn then by [∂C] we denote
the generator element of the reduced homology group H˜n−1(∂C) according to any orientation.
(The reduced homology group differs from the non-reduced only in dimension 0. For example,
[∂C] could be generated by any subdivision of C into parts topologically equivalent to Dn with
the boundary map applied to functions from the n-dimensional simplex to these parts of the
subdivision.) Let U be a non-empty open bounded subset of Rn. A compact (correspondence)
F ⊆ Rn × Y is said to have the spanning property for U if there exists a z in the reduced ho-
mology group H˜n−1(F | ∂U¯) such that the images of z in H˜n−1(∂U¯) and H˜n−1(F ) are [∂U¯ ]
and 0, respectively, where the first map is that induced by the canonical projection of F | ∂U¯ to
∂U¯ and the second map is that induced by the inclusion of F | ∂U¯ in the set F . If the compact
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that is has the spanning property for the closure of U . If F has the spanning property for an open
set U then F(x) = ∅ for every point x in U [17,18]. This property is the motivation for the term
“spanning”.
We demonstrate some of the power of the spanning property. In a usual proof of Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem, if a continuous function g :Dn → Dn did not have a fixed point then
there would be a continuous function f :Dn → Sn−1 such that f (x) = x for all x ∈ Sn−1, and
from looking at the induced homology groups we see that this is not possible. The spanning
property goes further: for any continuous function from Dn to Dn such that f (x) = x for all
x ∈ Sn−1 it holds that the image of f must cover all of Dn. Indeed, one can go further. Let
f :Dn → Rn × Rn be any continuous function such that f (x) = (x, x) for all x ∈ Sn−1. F :=
image (f ) is contractible, and hence has zero reduced homology groups for all dimensions.
Considering either the first or second copy of Sn−1 to be the domain of the correspondence F .
The embedding of Sn−1 into Sn−1 × Sn−1 yields an appropriate element of the n − 1 reduced
homology group of the correspondence over Sn−1, implying the spanning property for Dn. The
spanning property applied to either Dn in the first or second position in Rn × Rn implies that
both the image of F and the domain of F must contain Dn.
An important aspect of the spanning property is that it is preserved by restrictions to subsets.
Lemma 2 of [18] states that if F is spanning for a compact A and D is any closed subset of A
then F | D is also spanning for D.
Lemma 7. If a correspondence F has the spanning property for an open and bounded set
U ⊆ Rn and C is a connected and compact subset of U then for every pair x, y ∈ C there is
some z1 ∈ F(x) and some z2 ∈ F(y) such that (x, z1) and (y, z2) are in the same connected
component of F | C.
Proof. Let Ui be a decreasing sequence of open, bounded and connected subsets of U converg-
ing to C, meaning that C = ∩∞i=1Ui . By Lemma 2 of [18] there is connected and compact subset
Z1 of F such that Z1 is spanning for U1 and for every i = 2,3, . . . there is a connected and
compact subset Zi of Zi−1 such that the correspondence Zi is spanning for Ui . Due to [17,18]
for every i there are pairs (x, ai) and (y, bi) in Zi . Define Z to be the intersection of the Zi . Be-
cause the Zi are connected and compact, Z is also connected and compact. By its compactness
Z contains a pair (x, a) and (y, b) for some a and b as limits, respectively, of some subsequences
of the ai and bi . 
5.3. The structure theorem
A homotopy h between topological spaces X and Y is a map h :X × [0,1] → Y continuous
with respect to the product topology on X × [0,1]. If Y is embedded in a convex space then
the homotopy h :X × [0,1] → Y is a straight line homotopy if for every x ∈ X and t ∈ [0,1]
h(x, t) = t h(x,1)+ (1 − t)h(x,0).
There is a strong connection between quitting games and another area of game theory
usually not associated with stochastic games—structure theorems used to establish stability
properties of equilibria of one-shot games. We remind the readers of the main theorem of
Kohlberg and Mertens [4]. Let N be a finite player set, (Aj | j ∈ N) the finite sets of ac-
tions for the players, X the space of all |A1| × · · · × |A|N || matrices with vector payoff en-
tries from RN . For any x ∈ X let Gx be the one stage game defined by the matrix x. Let
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j∈N Δ(Aj ), the strategy space. Let E ⊆ X × A˜ be the correspondence defined by
E(x) := {y ∈ A˜ | y is an equilibrium of the game Gx}. Let π :X × A˜ → X be the canonical
projection. The structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens states that there is a straight line
homotopy H(·, ·) from X × [0,1] to X × A˜ such that π ◦ H(x,0) = x for all x ∈ X, the image
of H(·,1) is exactly equal to the correspondence E, and the function H can be extended contin-
uously to the one-point compactification of X (meaning that for every compact set C ⊆ X there
is an R > 0 large enough that if the norm ‖x‖ exceeds R then for all t ∈ [0,1] the point H(x, t)
does not lie over C). Here we have slightly modified the statement of the structure theorem, using
the fact that A˜ is convex.
5.4. Finitely repeated quitting games
For every k  1 and vector x ∈ RN let Γ kx be the k stage game such that at the conclusion of
k stages the players receive the payoff x given that all players chose c on all stages. A strategy
in Γ kx is a sequence p = (p0,p1, . . . , pk−1) ∈ ([0,1]N)k representing the probabilities that the
players would quit on the various stages. Let Ek ⊆ RN × ([0,1]N)k be the equilibrium corre-
spondence of the games Γ k , meaning that for all x ∈ RN the subset Ek(x) ⊆ ([0,1]N)k are the
equilibria of Γ kx . For all k  1 define the function f k : RN × ([0,1]N)k by f 1(x,p) = f (x,p)
and f k(x,p) = f (f k−1(x, (p1, . . . , pk−1)),p0). Define the correspondences Fk ⊆ RN ×RN by
Fk(x) = {f k(x,p) | p ∈ Ek(x)}. Fk contains the kth iteration of the correspondence F0, with
equality wherever no equilibrium involves quitting with certainty.
Lemma 8. Let x and y belong to a connected and compact subset D of RN such that no equilib-
rium of Γ kx on the set D involves some player quitting with certainty. Then for every k  1 there
is a pair px = (px0 ,px1 , . . . , pxk−1) and py = (py0 ,py1 , . . . , pyk−1) in ([0,1]N)k with (x,px) ∈ Ek
and (y,py) ∈ Ek such that (x,px) and (x,py) belong to the same connected component of
Ek | D, the equilibrium correspondence lying over D.
Proof. We represent the k repeated quitting game Γ kr as a game with the original set N of
players and finitely many actions. Let k, the number of stages, be fixed, and let each player n
have the finite set Ank = {c, q0, . . . , qk−1} of actions. The action qj means that the player will
choose c on all stages up to stage j and then choose q on stage j . If no player chooses qj for
any 0  j  k − 1 then the players will receive the payoff r . Otherwise, let j be the first stage
such that some player chooses qj and the payoff to the players will be v(A) where A is the set
of players who choose qj .
The actions Ank for all n ∈ N define games with variable payoff matrices. As above, define
X to be the space of all k + 1 × k + 1 × · · · × k + 1 payoff matrices, A˜ the space of mixed
strategies, and E ⊆ X × A˜ the equilibrium correspondence. Let H(·, ·) from X × [0,1] to A˜ be
the straight line homotopy [4] as described above such that the image of H(·,1) is the equilib-
rium correspondence E. Define iˆ : RN → X so that the (c, c, . . . , c) coordinate of i˜(r) is equal
to the chosen r ∈ RN and otherwise the other coordinates of i˜(r) are independent of the choice
of r and correspond to the appropriate v(A) defining the quitting game where A is the set of
players choosing ql with l the smallest number such that no player chose qi for all i < l. Let D˜
be the image i˜(D). Let R > 0 be large enough so that if ‖r‖ exceeds R then for all t ∈ [0,1]
the point H(r, t) projected to X does not lie in D˜. Define a continuous function bR :X → [0,1]
by bR(r) = 0 if ‖r‖  R + 1, bR(r) = 1 if ‖r‖  R, and otherwise bR(r) = R + 1 − ‖r‖ if
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correspondence h({r | ‖r‖ R + 2}) ⊆ X × A˜ has the spanning property for {r | ‖r‖R + 2}
(because the projection to X of h on {r | ‖r‖ = R + 2} is the identity function). By our choice of
R this same correspondence h({r | ‖r‖  R + 2}) over the set D˜ is the equilibrium correspon-
dence E over the set D˜. By Lemma 7 there is an equilibrium σx of Gi˜(x) and an equilibrium
σy of Gi˜(y) in the same connected component of E | D˜. For every mixed strategy σn ∈ Δ(Ank)
define the strategy p(σn) = (p0, . . . , pk−1) ∈ [0,1]k by pn0 := σn(q0) and for every i  1 define
pni := σ
n(qi )
1−∑i−1l=0 σn(ql) , with p
n
i = 0 if
∑i−1
l=0 σn(ql) = 1. This function takes equilibria of E | D˜ to
equilibria of Ek | D, continuously because there is no equilibrium over D involving quitting with
certainty. 
5.5. Escape games have approximate equilibria
We fix an escape game that has neither stationary approximate equilibria nor instant approx-
imate equilibria. Let ρ > 0 be a quantity defined by Lemma 5 and let  > 0 be strictly smaller
than either the ¯ > 0 defining the escape game or ρ. All claims that follow refer to this game.
Lemma 9. There is a quantity B > 0 so large that if x ∈ RN satisfies xj  B for all j ∈ N then
there is only one equilibrium in E0(x), namely 0, the equilibrium where no player chooses q with
positive probability on any stage.
Proof. Since every equilibrium involves a probability of at least ρ that no player chose the
action q , it suffices that B is larger than M+1
ρ
+ maxn∈N vn. 
In what follows we assume that the quantity B satisfying Lemma 9 is also larger than all
payoffs defining the quitting game plus 2.
Define the positive quantity δ to be 10M|N | . Define T := {x | vj  xj  vj +  for some
j ∈ N} ∩ {x | xj  vj for all j ∈ N}.
Define the correspondence F˜j,δ to be {(x, y) | x ∈ T , xj  vj + , y = f (x,p) for some p
satisfying 0 pj  δ and pk = 0 for all k = j}. Define F˜δ := F0⋃j∈N F˜j,δ .
Lemma 10. F˜δ ⊆ F and if an extended orbit of F˜δ starts at a point in {x | ∀j ∈ N xj  χj − }
then it remain in this set. If an extended orbit of F˜δ started at a point in Q then it remains in Q,
and if it starts in Q\(W ∪ T ) then it remains in Q\(W ∪ T ).
Proof. Assume that x ∈ T with vj  xj  vj +  and p ∈ F˜j,δ . By quitting alone player j gets
a payoff of vj and by not quitting a payoff of xj . By not quitting any other player k = j gets
a payoff of at least vk − δM and by quitting a payoff no better than vk + δM  vk + /10. This
completes the proof of F˜δ ⊆ F . Staying in the set {x | ∀j ∈ N xj  χj − } is the result of
Lemma 6.
Containment in Q follows by the containment of F˜δ in F , the definition of an escape game,
and the closure of Q.
Assume that x, y ∈ Q with x /∈ W ∪ T and y ∈ F˜δ(x). Since x is already outside of T we
know that y ∈ F0(x). By the definition of an escape game either y = x or yj > vj + ¯ for all
j ∈ N . Since ¯ is larger than  a convergence to a point in T is not possible. 
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xk = vk , and v({j})k < vk .
Lemma 11. From any start at a point in T there is a finite orbit of F˜δ staying in T that ends at
a critical point.
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 5 and the intermediate value theorem. 
Theorem 4. All escape games have approximate equilibria.
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim for escape games with neither stationary nor instant approx-
imate equilibria, and therefore for an escape game with ρ > 0,  > 0, and δ > 0 as chosen above.
By Theorem 3, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 it suffices to show that starting at any critical point
x ∈ Q∩ ∂W either there is an orbit of F˜δ in (W ∪T )∩Q with unbounded total variation or there
is an orbit of F˜δ , finite or infinite, ending or converging to some member of T ∩ Q with total
variation of at least δρ/3.
Given a critical point x ∈ Q ∩ ∂W with xj = vj , xi = vi and v({j})i < vi let y = f (x,p)
with pj = δ and pk = 0 for all k = j . Lemma 10 implies that y is in Q.
Case 1 (there is an infinite orbit of F0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T that does not
converge). By the definition of an escape game the orbit is in Q and non-convergence implies
unbounded total variation.
Case 2 (there is an infinite orbit of F0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T that does converge).
Convergence to a point z in the interior of W is impossible, since a distance of t > 0 from the
boundary of W implies that any equilibrium of Γz involves a probability of quitting of at least
t/M , and by Lemma 5 this would also mean a motion of at least ρt/M away from this point.
With the assumption that the orbit converges to a point in T , a total variation of at least ρδ is
obtained in the motion from x to y. The convergence point is in Q because Q is closed.
Case 3 (there is no infinite orbit of F0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T ). By Lemma 10
Fk(y) ∩ (W ∪ T ) = ∅ implies that there is an orbit of F0 of length k contained in W ∪ T .
Therefore there must be a k such that Fk(y) is contained in the complement of W ∪ T , since
otherwise by the closure of the correspondence F0 the existence of a finite orbit of F0 of length
k contained in W ∪ T for every k would imply the existence an infinite orbit of F0 in W ∪ T , (an
easy exercise, also see [11] for many related results about correspondences).
Let B be the large positive quantity as stated above and let x¯ be a point such that the closed line
segment between x and x¯ is in Q, B > x¯j > vj for all j ∈ N and x¯k < vk + ¯/2 for some k ∈ N .
Consider three line segments, that from y to x, that from x to x¯, and that from x¯ to the point
z := (B,B, . . . ,B); define D to be the union of these three line segments. Define a complete
ordering on D in the natural way so that z > x¯ > x > y. Lemma 9 implies that 0 is the only
member of Ek(z), where in this context 0 is the sequence of length k in ([0,1]N)k where all
players choose c with certainty at every stage. By Lemma 8 there is a p in Ek(y) so that (z,0)
and (y,p) are in same connected component of Ek | D. Let x˜ ∈ D be any point with x < x˜  x¯.
If (x˜, p˜) ∈ Ek and q(p˜) > 0 then from the definition of an escape game q(p˜) is at least ¯/(2M).
Furthermore there will be a positive constant c > 0 such that if x˜ ∈ D satisfies x¯  x˜  z then
R.S. Simon / Advances in Applied Mathematics 38 (2007) 1–26 25the distance from x˜ to W is at least c, and therefore if p˜ ∈ Ek(x˜) then the probability q(p˜) will
be at least c/M . Let d = 13M min{c, }.
It suffices to show that there is a finite orbit of F0 of length k starting at some yˆ ∈ D with
y  yˆ  x and ending at some zˆ with zˆj = vj +  for some j ∈ N and zˆk  vk +  for all k ∈ N .
By Lemma 10 all points in this orbit would be in Q ∩ (W ∪ T ). By Lemma 11 there would be a
return from zˆ to the set ∂W ∩Q using F˜δ . The total variation of this return would be at least .
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is no such finite orbit. Define open subsets
O1,O2 of D × ([0,1]N)k by O1 := {(x˜, p˜) | x˜ > x, q(p˜) < d} and O2 := {(x˜, p˜) | x˜ < x¯,
minn∈N((f k(x˜, p˜))n−vn) < }. Let O be O1 ∪O2. By assumption ∂O , the boundary of the open
set O , contains no members of Ek | D, (here  < ¯ is used and that the closure of O1 that is lying
over x is included in O2). The point (z,0) is in O and the point (y,p) is in (D × ([0,1]N)k)\O ,
which means that (z,0) and (y,p) lie in two distinct connected components of Ek | D, a contra-
diction. 
6. Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, the task of determining whether a normal stochastic game has
approximate equilibria can be broken up into two steps: (a) does some perfection property hold?
and (b) can this perfection property imply the existence of approximate equilibria? How does the
proof for escape games orient us either toward a proof for all normal stochastic games or toward
discovering a counter example?
If a counter example exists that is not a quitting game it is likely to be very difficult to find.
Stochastic games are played on infinitely many stages, and therefore in general the game trees
branch wildly. Quitting games are designed to prevent rapidly growing ways that a player could
respond to the past behavior of the other players. In our opinion, to find a counter example (if one
exists) one would fair a better chance staying with quitting games that are not escape games.
Even though a quitting game counter example would be the easiest to find (if one exists),
nevertheless finding one must be very difficult! Any counter example must fail to be an escape
game, which means that over some x outside of the set W there are equilibria involving a positive
probability of quitting. Since for any point x outside of W the set F0(x) contains at least x from
the equilibrium 0 and generically F0(x) has an odd number of points, for many x not in W the
set F0(x)\{x} would contain at least two points. Any analysis of orbits for a candidate counter
example must involve multiple choices for some of the vectors reached.
What are the prospects for finding a proof for quitting games? Part “b”, the step from perfec-
tion to approximate equilibria, is solved for quitting games. However Part “a”, the establishment
of an appropriate structure with the perfection property, appears to be daunting. The proof for es-
cape games involved the existence of an orbit with infinite total variation. Infinite total variation
is an analytic property, orbit existence an algebraic property. It seems to be a coincidence that
there was a synthesis for a proof of Theorem 4.
Given that there is a proof for the existence of approximate equilibria in quitting games (solv-
ing Part “a”) that can be extended to larger classes of normal stochastic games, what are the
prospects for a proof for all normal stochastic games? We are still faced with the problems of
Part “b” and the fact that the scope of Theorem 2 is very limited. Example 1 is highly discourag-
ing, and perhaps a variation of this example with an infinite number of states could be the basis
of a counter example (though its analysis would be very difficult, as explained above). The idea
would be that the number of distinct states that can be visited on the ith stage goes to infinity as
i goes to infinity.
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